



**MMC Latin America  
and the Caribbean**

**QUARTER 4 2024**



# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Latin America and the Caribbean

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. The core areas of focus include mixed migration dynamics within South America, mixed movements from this part of the region towards North America, and mixed migration in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to some countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

For more information on MMC and the quarterly updates from other regions, visit [mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and subscribe to the [MMC newsletter](#) to receive our latest research. Follow us on BlueSky [@mixedmigration.org](#), on X [@Mixed\\_Migration](#) and LinkedIn [@mixedmigration-centre](#).

### MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes migrants travelling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often travelling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

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# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Latin America and the Caribbean


## Quarter 4 - 2024

### Key Updates

- **The number of recorded arrivals in Panama from the Darien reduced significantly throughout 2024, and most significantly in the last quarter. Amid Panamanian efforts to deter migration through deportations, physical barriers, and fines,** the number of recorded crossings into Panama through the Darien [fell](#) from 520,085 in 2023 to 302,203 in 2024. The decline continued in the final quarter of 2024, falling from 62,233 in the third quarter to 38,907 in the fourth quarter.
- **The number of Venezuelans leaving the country appeared to decrease in the last quarter of 2024.** The level of reported irregular migration to Colombia [declined](#) from an estimated 87,769 entries in the third quarter of 2024 to 71,441 in the fourth quarter, an 18.6% decrease.
- **Mexican soldiers kill migrants, sparking calls for revision of policy.** On October 1, Mexican soldiers [fired](#) on a convoy of migrants, resulting in six deaths and ten injuries. President Sheinbaum denounced the incident and called for an investigation, which also sparked calls for policy review with the Mexican bishops conference, for example, [calling](#) the incident a result of militarisation of immigration control.
- **Violence in Haiti continues to cause mass displacement. Gangs are moving into ever more neighbourhoods, displacing [more than](#) 70,000 between October and December and adding to the estimated 700,000 that were displaced at the start of the quarter.**
- **Despite violence, Haitians continue to be deported.** 66,491 were returned in the last three months of the year alone, a 33% increase over the third quarter, according to [IOM](#). The vast majority, more than 98%, were returned from the Dominican Republic, where President Abinader [announced](#) an operation in October to deport 10,000 per week.
- **Argentina adopts [decree](#) modifying its 2006 Refugee Law, expanding grounds for exclusion and reducing opportunities for appeal.** The new emergency decree in Argentina expands the grounds on which applicants can be excluded from refugee status and reduces the amount of time that they have to appeal.



## Regional Overview\*



## The Caribbean



\*The information in the map refers to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration flows in and out of Latin America and the Caribbean.

# Mixed Migration Regional Updates

## Mixed migration dynamics in South America

### Migration from Venezuela

Migration from Venezuela appears to have reduced in November and December following an increase around the contested 28 July elections. After a 23% increase in entries from Venezuela to Colombia in the third quarter of 2024 [as compared](#) to the second quarter, an 18.6% decrease was observed in the fourth quarter. In the first month of Q4, entries were still similar to Q3 levels (31,129 entries in October 2024) but dropped to an average of 18,265 per month in November and December. These numbers are consistent with the data on Venezuelans passing through the Darien, which show that crossings for this nationality [increased](#) from 11,733 in August 2024 to 19,800 in September and 19,522 in October, before falling to 8,901 in November and 2,992 in December. It is not clear why there has been a decrease in November and December, but similar decreases in November and December have been noted in prior years. Experts [speculate](#) that migration may increase again following Maduro's inauguration on 10 January.

## New immigration restrictions and enforcement measures

### Argentinian navy starts to patrol the border with Bolivia

On 9 December, Argentina's Minister of Security [announced](#) that the Argentinian Navy would start patrolling the Bermejo River, which until now has only been patrolled by Bolivia. Although the plan was presented in the context of addressing drug trafficking into the country, Naval forces may also encounter migrants. The implications for policy are not yet clear.

### Brazil continues to restrict asylum applications

Brazil's Superior Court of Justice [allowed](#) restrictions on transit passengers and "abusive" asylum claims imposed by the Ministry of Justice in August (and covered in our previous [Quarterly Update](#)) to remain in force and permitted the deportation of migrants. The provisions prohibited transit passengers from applying for asylum. The decision [overturned](#) an injunction filed by the public defender, which sought to prevent asylum seekers at São Paulo's Guarulhos Airport from being returned and grant them access to asylum procedures. Experts say that [the decision](#) significantly reduces the possibility of challenging the measures in Brazilian courts. As of mid-November, an estimated 182 migrants were detained at the airport, [according](#) to the Justice Ministry.

### Peru steps up enforcement

In October, Peruvian President Dina Boluarte [announced](#) new immigration regulations that would require Venezuelans to present work and rental contracts in order to be able to legally stay in Peru. The Venezuelan advocacy organisation Veneactiva [expressed](#) concern about the measure which they called potentially discriminatory, noting the challenges in obtaining formal employment in Peru. Another executive decree [required](#) hosts or landlords to request identity and travel documents from foreigners to whom they were thinking about renting, which could also push vulnerable undocumented migrants into greater vulnerability.

## Anti-immigration sentiment continues to grow in Chile

A growing body of opinion research shows that concern about immigration continues to grow in Chile, and there is increasing support for tough immigration measures. A LatAM Pulse [poll](#) revealed that 95.5% of Chileans are in favour of more restrictive immigration policies. Chilean concern about immigration is rooted [in the impression](#) that immigration is increasing criminality and insecurity in the country. These concerns are based on an increase in violence in Chile but a false perception of migrants' role, as the [evidence](#) is very clear that most of these events are committed by Chileans. Migrants are also [victims](#) of these crimes, with 20% of homicide victims in 2024 being foreigners, compared to just 4% in 2020. The negative attitudes towards migrants have also been channelled into xenophobic actions, with different incidents having been reported in [November](#) and [December](#). Migrants asked for additional security, while the Venezuelan group called Comando con Venezuela issued a [statement](#) in December denouncing rising xenophobia, which they claim exposes thousands to violence.

## Migration from Ecuador decreases, but interest remains high

Figures from the [Colombian Ministry of Exterior](#), the Panamanian migration authorities and US Customs and Border Patrol show that immigration to Central and North America from Ecuador fell in the last quarter of 2024. [Reported](#) monthly average encounters on the southern US border in this quarter averaged just 1,902, a 77% reduction over the first nine months of 2024. This was a sharper decrease than the 50% decline over all nationalities over the same period. Similarly, in the [Darien](#), an average of 424 arrivals of Ecuadorians per month were recorded by the Panamanian authorities in Q4, as compared to the average of 1,381 per month through the whole of 2024, a 70% reduction, again a sharper decline than the 49% decrease seen over all nationalities. At the same time, between January and October 2024, more than [80,000](#) internally displaced persons were reported.

Despite this decline, a failure to address the root causes of migration could cause mixed migration to rise again and internal displacement to become widespread. One key issue is [gang violence](#). Although the government declared war on gangs in 2024, they are far from removing the threat. Homicide rates [fell 16%](#) in 2024 relative to 2023 but [stayed](#) at the second-highest level in the last six years. The rate of kidnapping and extortion also increased. In addition, the [structure](#) of gangs is changing and becoming more horizontal, which has led to more conflict within gangs. Moreover, frequent and ongoing blackouts throughout Q4 have [taken a toll](#) on the country's economy, disrupting particularly the activities of small business owners and causing job losses. If violence and economic disruption increase in 2025, the level of migration is likely to increase as well.

## Mixed movements towards North America

### Biden reinforces restrictive measures

In late September, the Biden administration [reinforced](#) asylum restrictions imposed in June. The original measure blocked access to the asylum process in most cases when border apprehensions rise above 1,500 per day, allowing the restrictions to be removed when the average crossings per day fell below that number on average over seven days. The modification made on the last day of September required the numbers to stay below 1,500 on average over 28 days. Numbers have not fallen this low in recent history, indicating that the measures will likely stay in place indefinitely.

### Colombia prevented Venezuelans from leaving

Some Colombian and Venezuelan media [reported](#) that, in November, Migración Colombia (the national migratory authority) prevented Venezuelans accepted for resettlement by the Safe Mobility Initiative from travelling to the United States because their passports were expired. These actions would have violated Colombia's [Resolution 2231 of 2021](#), which allows Venezuelans to travel on passports that are up to ten years expired because of the well-documented difficulties that Venezuelans face in seeking to renew their passports. The Colombian immigration services [deny](#) acting contrary to national policy.

### Arrivals at the US Southern Border continue at low levels

Encounters at the US Southern Border have [dropped](#) consistently since June/July this year, a trend that solidified during this quarter. While encounters in October (56,521) were still similar to those of the previous quarter, when they had averaged around 56,000, encounters decreased further in November (46,615) and December (47,326). The data recorded in November 2024 constitute the [lowest number](#) since [July 2020](#). This comes as a result of President Biden's harsh border and immigration policies (including limits on asylum), measures taken by Mexico to stop migrants from reaching the US Southern Border, and Panamanian efforts to "close" the Darien Gap (as discussed in detail in [QMMU3 2024](#)).

### Numbers of migrants in the Darien continue to fall amid tougher controls

There has been a large decrease in the number of people crossing through the Darien in the last quarter of 2024 amid ongoing Panamanian and US efforts to reduce migration through the corridor. Recorded [arrivals](#) were just 4,849 in December 2024, the lowest single-month total since [April 2022](#). 38,907 arrivals were recorded in the fourth quarter of 2024, as compared to 62,233 in the third quarter of 2024 and 111,203 in the fourth quarter of 2023.

The reductions come amid increased control measures, including an expansion of deportations. In July, the US and Panama signed an agreement (covered in our [Quarter 2 update](#)) through which the US agreed to support repatriations. These operations have now begun. As of October 2024, 787 migrants had been

[deported](#) on 19 flights at an estimated [cost](#) of US \$1,140,846. In November, a flight to Vietnam and India was [organised](#). As an additional measure, Panama [announced](#) fines for irregular entry in October 2024. The fines for entering without passing through a border post range from US \$300 to US \$5,000. Fines increase if the same offense is committed multiple times. Those who do not pay will not [be allowed](#) to leave the country. The Panamanian government also [re-imposed](#) transit visa requirements on Cubans under Executive Decree No. 195 on 25 October 2024. These changes build on new requirements for tourist visas introduced in July, including that the visa must be [processed](#) by a qualified Panamanian lawyer.

## Mixed migration dynamics in Central America

### Migration through Guatemala and Honduras decreases

The number of migrant arrivals in Guatemala and Honduras decreased in the fourth quarter. In Guatemala, 37,254 arrivals were [recorded](#) in the fourth quarter, down from 60,183 in the third quarter. In Honduras, 56,705 arrivals were [recorded](#) in the fourth quarter, as compared to 64,518 in the third. 17,951 migrant arrivals were recorded in [November](#), and 10,576 in [December](#) in Honduras, significantly less than the monthly average through the first nine months of 2024, of 34,728. A total of [369,250](#) arrivals were recorded in the country in 2024, a 32% decrease in arrivals compared with 2023. The reduction in number of arrivals is in line with the findings of reduced movement along the corridor from Panama through to the US Southern border.

### Guatemala takes action against migrant smuggling

In October, Guatemala authorities [arrested](#) 36 people, including 23 active police officers, accused of taking money from migrants of various nationalities to allow them to continue their journeys through Guatemala. The network is accused of having facilitated the movement of hundreds of migrants to the United States. Later in the month, two more presumed smugglers were [arrested](#) together with 70 migrants of various nationalities. In December, an accused smuggler was [arrested](#) in the Guatemalan department of Chiquimula, near the border with Honduras, alongside 13 Cubans.

## Mixed Migration Dynamics in Mexico

### Mexican soldiers fire on migrants

On October 1, Mexican soldiers [fired](#) on a convoy of migrants in the southern state of Chiapas. They say that they mistook the convoy for organised criminals after hearing explosions. Six of the migrants died, and ten others were reportedly injured.

President Sheinbaum called the event “regrettable” and called for an investigation. Later in the month, the soldiers involved were arrested. The Catholic Church [urged](#) that the incident should prompt a re-evaluation of the military’s role in regulating migration in the country, and rights activists emphasised the importance of accountability, pointing out [past failures](#) to hold the military accountable.



## New migrant caravans seek to reach the US before Trump is inaugurated

A migrant caravan of approximately 2,000 people [started out](#) from the southern Mexican town of Tapachula, near the Guatemalan border in October. Migrants in the caravan cited a desire to reach the border before a new administration came in, potentially ending access to the CBP One app, which allows people to make appointments for regular border crossings. Another 1,500 people [formed](#) a caravan in the same area in November. Trump has [referred](#) to such caravans as evidence in favour of the tariffs he has threatened to impose on all goods arriving to the US from Mexico (and Canada). Still, in reality, such caravans rarely make it to the US border, being broken up by the Mexican authorities.

## Mexican and US deterrence measures leave migrants vulnerable

In October 2024, *The New Humanitarian* [profiled](#) the challenges facing migrants stranded in southern Mexico, where numbers have been increasing. [According](#) to the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance, known by its Spanish acronym, COMAR, 66% of asylum applications (52,808 of 78,975) filed in Mexico in 2024 were filed from the southern state of Chiapas, compared to 61% (86,863 of 140,982) in 2023. The increase in the region appears to be a result of US and Mexican deterrence measures preventing them from moving on. The Mexican government is [reportedly](#) bussing migrants to northern states to relieve pressure on the capital, but a migrant rights monitoring group in Mexico City says that this is being done with too little coordination and leaves migrants vulnerable.

However, the southern region is gripped by violence between rival gangs, which exposes migrants to extortion, kidnapping, and other threats. A DRC and NRC [report](#) covering October and November found that 76.2% of families in transit and 50% of families at their destination had suffered some type of abuse since they arrived in Mexico. Thirty-nine per cent felt that the areas where they were insecure or very insecure. Humanitarian organisations struggle to provide assistance in this violent context, further exacerbating vulnerabilities.

## Extracontinental migration to the Americas

### Chinese migration through the Americas declines

After the imposition of visa requirements for Chinese nationals entering Ecuador in July 2024 (as reported in the second [Quarterly Update](#) this year), the crossings of Chinese migrants through the Americas and their arrivals to the US decreased drastically. At the end of 2024, Chinese nationals were the fourth nationality with the most crossings through the [Darién Gap](#) (12,398). However, during the fourth quarter, a low average of 68 Chinese used this route each month, a reduction of 96% compared to the monthly average of 1,874 people who did so during the first half of the year. Similarly, irregular Chinese migrants registered in [Honduras](#) and at the [US southern border](#) dropped respectively by 84 and 68%, from a monthly average of 1,441 and 3,046 individuals during the first semester of 2024, to 232 and 986 during this quarter.

## Mixed migration in the Caribbean

### Violence in Haiti continues to cause displacement

Despite the [deployment](#) of international peacekeepers to Haiti, violence has worsened, leaving 1,041,229 displaced [by the end of December](#). This is 48% more than the 702,973 who were displaced as of September, as reported in our [third quarter report](#). Many of these were part of mass displacement events. In just [ten days](#), from 10-20 November, 40,965 were displaced in the largest displacement tracked by the Displacement Tracking Matrix since it started its Emergency Tracking Tool, in January 2023. In December, at least 21,000 were displaced, including an [estimated](#) 10,867 who fled a series of attacks on the Poste Marchand neighbourhood in Port au Prince in mid-December and [an estimated](#) 10,606 people who fled armed attacks on Artibonite, north of the capital, on 10 December. Many of the displaced are fleeing gang violence in neighbourhoods that had previously been less affected. For example, in October, the Viv Ansanm gang coalition [attacked](#) Solino and Tabarre 27. On 6 and 7 December, more than 100 people [were killed](#) by gangs in the Cité Soleil neighbourhood of Port au Prince.

### Haitians deported despite ongoing crisis in the country

Despite the dire human rights and humanitarian situation driving ongoing displacement in Haiti, Haitians continue to be deported to the country. 67,496 were returned in the last quarter of 2024 according to [IOM](#), a 33% increase over the 50,393 deported in the third quarter of 2024 and a 13% increase over the fourth quarter of 2023. The vast majority of these, 98.5%, were deported from the Dominican Republic. In October, the Dominican Republic announced a [new plan to](#) increase deportations from the country, [saying](#) that there was an “excess” of Haitians in the country and threatening to deport 10,000 a week through the end of the year. Although that pace was [not sustained](#), it is significant and challenging given the dire situation in Haiti.

Although the Dominican Republic is the source of the majority of deportations, they are not the only country carrying out deportations. After the US Department of Homeland Security [resumed](#) deportations to Port au Prince in late September, 361 Haitians were [deported](#) from the US in the fourth quarter of 2024. Additional deportations have been carried out by Jamaica, which returned 37 Haitians during the quarter, [including](#) 20 in October. Human rights defenders have [expressed concerns](#) about the capacity of the country to absorb the deportees. The UN Commission on Human Rights has [recommended](#) that the US suspend deportations in light of the current situation. Jamaican rights groups [protested](#) the move, saying that the deportees were denied access to asylum procedures as provided for under Jamaica’s 2009 Refugee Law.

### Guyana promises progress towards freedom of movement for CARICOM

In December, Guyana [reported](#) that it was leading a “coalition of the willing” to implement freedom of movement in parts of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a coalition of 15 Caribbean nations. Over the past several years, the community has been working to develop a shared regional migration strategy. In July 2023, the CARICOM [decided](#) to extend freedom of movement to live and work across the region to

nationals of all its member states by March 31, 2024. This decision, however, has yet to be implemented at all. This is, in part, the result of preoccupation about the potential arrivals from Haiti, both due to concerns about absorption capacity and prejudice against Haitians in parts of the community. Most regional states [maintain](#) visa requirements for Haitians. For now, Haiti is excluded from the regional agreement, at the request of former Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who [asked](#) that Haiti be temporarily excluded due to its inability to meet the requirements.

## Migrants apprehended in Turks and Caicos

In October, 27 migrants, believed to be Haitians, were apprehended on Ambergris Cay in Turks and Caicos, and later detained. Turks and Caicos authorities [apprehended](#) 92 irregular migrants through district checks from 4-6 November; all but one were believed to be Haitians. In mid-November, Turks and Caicos authorities [intercepted](#) a vessel as individuals were observed jumping overboard. These migrants are a reminder of continuing migration by sea in and from the Caribbean over dangerous waters. The IOM's missing migrants project [reported](#) that 341 migrants were killed or went missing in Caribbean crossings in 2024.

## Policy and legal updates

### Update on regularisation processes and integration-related policies in South America

#### **São Paulo, Brazil begins a new phase of its Operation Horizon regularisation initiative**

In November, the Brazilian state of São Paulo [initiated](#) the 12th phase of its Operation Horizon initiative. This programme is a partnership between the São Paulo military police, the *Centro de Integração de Cidadania* (a service of the state of São Paulo), and UNHCR, which works to orient migrants on how they can regularise their status. The process can facilitate access to processes of asylum, seeking residence as a member of MERCOSUR, temporary humanitarian status, family reunification, or residency based on the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. Since January 2023, almost 65,000 people have been able to [regularise](#) their status using simplified procedures available to citizens of MERCOSUR or the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries or Lusophone Community, a [community](#) of nine Portuguese-speaking countries whose nationals get [preferential](#) access to Brazilian immigration.

#### **Regularisation effort under consideration in Chile**

Chile is considering a new [registration initiative](#), but details are still unclear. The government has [said](#) that if the programme is to be implemented, it will not be a general amnesty, but will be extended to those who can show work or family roots in the country and are among the 180,000 who have registered with the government in the *empadronamiento* (registration) process. They argue that regularisation is necessary for security and economic reasons, helping to [prevent](#) migrants from being recruited by criminal groups and creating economic benefits. A government spokesperson [dismissed](#) concerns that such an effort would create a pull factor for further immigration, noting that “there is no evidence in the world that these regularisation processes create a pull factor.” More than 300 individuals and organisations [called](#) on the government to implement the programme, at least for those who are registered and entered

legally. However, with xenophobia on the rise, it remains to be seen whether the bill will be introduced and approved.

### **Milei government calls for higher costs to be imposed on migrants in Argentina**

The Milei government has [announced](#) that it will take action to put an end to the ability of migrants to access free health care and university education. The presidential spokesperson argued that these changes were necessary to prevent “opportunists” from taking advantage of the system. The national government does not actually control policymaking on either issue, as provinces control health spending and universities decide on their own fee policies. However, Salta, Jujuy, Mendoza, and Santa Cruz provinces have already [imposed](#) charges on health care, so others may also be interested in implementing the government’s suggestions, which could leave migrants more vulnerable as many will be unable to access health care or education under these circumstances.

### **Colombia launches new regularisation programme for Venezuelans with stepbacks compared to the previous one**

On 4 December 2024, Colombia [launched](#) a new visa programme under [Resolution No. 12509](#), providing a V visa (or visitor visa) for Venezuelans in the country. The visa programme offers a two-year residency, which cannot be [renewed](#), for those who entered the country before the programme went into effect and can provide the necessary documentation. The visa would [cost](#) about 37 USD plus the cost of a foreign ID card. The visa is quite limited when compared to the previous temporary residence (PPT) process, which offered ten years of residency, was free and did not require valid documentation. The cost will likely strain many vulnerable migrants, and the documentary requirements will exclude others. Those entering the country after the programme’s start will have to apply for more costly visas that also have more extensive requirements, which many cannot afford or meet, forcing them to wait for another regularisation initiative.

### **Ecuador opens registration for its latest regularisation initiative**

The government of Ecuador opened registration for the regularisation process that was authorised by President Daniel Noboa in August, as described in our [Quarter 3 update](#). The process targets those who were not able to participate in the last regularisation initiative. Registration for the new process [was opened](#) on 25 November and in just the first three days, 495 people applied. The new process [accepts](#) Venezuelan identity documents up to five years after their expiration in recognition of the difficulty of obtaining new documents from Venezuelan authorities.

## **Modifications to immigration policies in the region**

### **Wide-ranging modifications of Chile’s immigration law under consideration**

On 26 November, Chile’s House of Representatives approved a new law modifying 56 provisions of its immigration law, which now moves to the Senate for [approval](#). The law [expands](#) the use of biometric identification data, [adds](#) domestic violence, sexual exploitation, and illegal arms possession as deportable offences to include and allows withdrawal of immigration status if an individual is repeatedly convicted of more mundane offences, such as being a public nuisance or unlicensed vending. It also imposes significant penalties on persons or businesses that facilitate irregular entry and increases the resident requirement for naturalisation from five to 10 years.



The new proposed law also [creates](#) a new procedure for adjudicating cases of unaccompanied or undocumented children, allowing a family court to review the child's situation and order them to stay or go. The Jesuit Service for Migrants in Chile [expressed concern](#) that the new law would “exempt the state from the obligation to protect unaccompanied children seeking protection.”

### **New law in Peru requires migrants to identify themselves to the authorities**

A new law, [No 32192](#), passed by the Peruvian parliament in November, creates potential penalties for foreigners who fail to identify themselves to the relevant authorities. The process focuses on gathering biometric data on them and their migration histories, but it does not imply that they will be able to access a regular status. Those who fail to comply can be expelled under the new law. However, the law itself is unclear. It refers to penalties for not identifying oneself but doesn't describe the identification process clearly. It also does not specify the time frame within which identification should occur.

### **Honduras extends amnesty for immigration fines**

Honduras [adopted](#) a new law in November extending its current amnesty policy ahead of its planned expiry in December. Honduran law [currently](#) imposes a fine of US \$240 on those who enter its territory irregularly, but the current amnesty exempts those who are only in transit.

### **New immigration law under consideration in Nicaragua targets expatriates**

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega [presented](#) a law reforming Nicaragua's migration law to parliament in November. Parliament [approved](#) it on the 28th of that month. The new law provides for penalties of two to six years in prison for those who leave the country with the [intent](#) to “disrupt constitutional order,” or “conspire and incite acts of terrorism or economic and social destabilization.” If Nicaraguans attempt to re-enter unofficially, they can be expelled. This seems to target political opponents if they choose to, or are forced to, return home. These restrictions on return [suggest](#) that the procedure could be used to strip citizenship from citizens as the government already did to 94 political opponents in 2023. Migrants who do not have problems with the government and had previously been returning regularly also [expressed concern](#) about the possibility of getting caught up in the targeting of political opponents.

### **Dominican Republic considers new restrictions on migration**

A new anti-immigration proposal introduced into the Dominican legislature in October would impose [stiff](#) new fines for those who are deported and attempt to immigrate to the Dominican Republic again. Individuals could be fined up to 20 times a public sector employee's salary for a second offence. Another aspect of the [law](#) would require landlords to verify the immigration status of their tenants, restrict access to some types of work and require government approval of sales of real estate to migrants. In addition, the Minister of the Interior and the Police [announced](#) the creation of a new police unit focused on “strengthening border surveillance and national security.”

## **Modifications to asylum processes in the region**

### **New Argentinean Decree limits review in asylum cases**

On 21 October 2024, the Argentinean government approved a new emergency decree, [DNU 924/24](#), modifying Argentina's [2006 Refugee Law](#), [to address](#) security concerns and an increase in asylum

applications. Official government statistics, however, [show](#) only a 5% increase since 2016. The decree [eliminates](#) the possibility of administrative review of negative decisions, which migrant rights advocates argue imposes a strain on applicants, who would now have to proceed directly to a judicial review. Judicial reviews require more legal support, which can be difficult for asylum seekers to both find and fund. It also reduces the time limit for requesting a review from 30 to five days. This deadline can be difficult for asylum seekers to meet due to obstacles to obtaining counsel and the complexity of their cases.

The decree also expands the [exclusion criteria](#) for refugee status to include any “serious” crime”. This contrasts with the more narrow international law, which [provides](#) for exclusion of non-political crimes only. The failure to address the political nature of some crimes could result in a larger number of asylum applicants being rejected.

### **Canada reduces immigration quotas**

In October, the government [announced](#) that it was slashing the projected number of new permanent residents that would be accepted in coming years from a previously projected 485,000 in 2025 to 395,000, with further reductions in 2026 and 2027. Moreover, in November, the Canadian immigration minister [proposed](#) several reforms aimed at expediting the processing of an increasing number of applications which are unlikely to be granted asylum.

### **Turks and Caicos considers new asylum law**

The government of Turks and Caicos is considering a new asylum law. Asylum is already [provided for](#) under Turks and Caicos immigration law, but the new law sets up specialised structures to hear cases and their reviews. The immigration minister, Arlington “Chuck” Musgrove, has advocated for the legislation, [arguing](#) that it will help to secure the country’s borders. The law forbids anyone who entered the country irregularly from applying for asylum. However, UNHCR legal guidance [points out](#) that asylum seekers and refugees should not be penalised only for entering a country irregularly under Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The bill also provides for strict penalties for anyone who facilitates irregular entry by another. Opposition politicians, however, have [raised concerns](#) that even as some who enter irregularly are excluded from the asylum process, provisions of the bill that allow for those in legal custody or granted leave to access the process could lead to the country being overloaded with claims.

## **Updates on regional cooperation and bilateral agreements**

### **Panamanian and Colombian Ombudsperson Offices sign a memorandum of understanding**

The Panamanian and Colombian Ombudsperson’s Offices have [signed](#) a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on migration and human rights. The MoU provides for collaboration to develop strategies to advocate for migration policies that protect human rights. Specifically, the offices commit to understanding the specific needs of vulnerable populations including women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and LGBTQI+ populations. The MoU also envisages missions to the Darien to better understand the situation there.


### **Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador sign an agreement on migration**

The Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadoran governments, along with [IOM](#), met in October to discuss an agreement under the auspices of [Plan Trifinio](#), a regional mechanism joining the three countries to

better manage natural resources and to benefit border communities. The agreement [focused](#) on building institutional capacity and improving migration management.

### **Cartagena +40 process adopts the Chile Declaration and Plan of Action**

In December 2024, Latin American and Caribbean states came together to adopt the [Chile Declaration and Plan of Action](#) on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration. The declaration and plan of action are intended to reiterate the region's commitment to refugee protection and to provide a blueprint for innovative action over the next decade to address the developing challenges on the continent. The Plan of Action seeks to reinforce the protection of refugees and displaced people through improved screening systems, data management, assistance, and technical innovation. It will also seek to promote temporary regularisation procedures. The Plan of Action also lays out a programme of action for ending statelessness on the continent.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based mixed migration responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

**For more information visit:** [www.mixedmigration.org](http://www.mixedmigration.org)

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